

# The Rosepark Fire: Ignition and early development

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### HSL involvement



 Incident investigated by Strathclyde Police and HSE

 HSL commissioned by Mr J Madden, Specialist Electrical Inspector, HSE

### HSL objectives



## Examine early stages of fire while confined to cupboard, in particular:

- Examine potential for electrical faults to ignite other fuels in cupboard.
- Examine resulting pattern of burning.
- Examine early stages of fire growth and specify fire on break out from cupboard, identify critical timings and compare resulting damage pattern with incident.

## This presentation and test programme



- Brief recap of damage in cupboard.
- Tests on distribution board materials.
- Test fires within distribution board casing.
- Fires with cupboard mock-up.
- Spark ignition tests with potential fuels.

Additional testing was also carried out to examine the role played by two upholstered chairs found in the corridor.

### Damage to incident cupboard






Doors not totally consumed but greater damage higher up

Major damage on lower LHS – evidence for fire in plastic items

#### Incident distribution board






Some evidence for damage to electrical wiring in disrtribution board casing

Some erosion of copper bus bar

**Erosion of a rear cable entry point** 

Coincident with cable melting/erosion

**Possible arcing locations** 



## Tests with distribution board materials 1



### Laboratory analysis of distribution board materials

FTIR, GC and MS to identify materials eg MCB material – glass reinforced nylon 6-6 with added fire retardant


#### Conclusion

Materials were as specified and fit for purpose

## Tests with distribution board materials 2



### Glow wire testing - BS 6458-2.1 (1984)



Electrically heated glow wire at temperatures up to 960°C.

Tip of the glow wire is pressed into surface of the plastic component.

Parameters such as penetration depth and presence of flame, smoke noted.

To be compliant, plastics used for parts of the distribution board must withstand a range of glow wire temperatures, dependent on proximity to conducting metal parts.

Tests here went beyond the standard

#### Conclusion: All materials fit for purpose

## Tests with distribution board materials 3



#### Bus bar temperature tests

Check if bus bar could attain a temperature sufficient to damage PVC insulation

Board fitted out as in incident

6 hours @ 83 a (normal) - temp 27.7°C

14 hours @ 102 a (overload) - temp 36.5°C

#### Conclusion

No melting of PVC insulation

### Fires in distribution board



Two forms of testing

Flame impingement on mcbs

Fires internal to the distribution board casing

### MCB flame impingement tests





- Test to examine behaviour of mcbs to open flaming
- Merlin Gerin and MEM mcbs under load
- Exposed to 2 of BS No 7 cribs
- Both mcbs tripped
- Damage consistent with incident mcbs


#### Fires inside distribution board 1



- Examine potential for fires inside distribution board to grow and spread externally
- Examine for potential to self-extinguish
- Board set up as in incident using new equipment
- Fire source small tray of diesel
- Ignition source electric match surrounded by 5 conventional matches.

#### Fires inside distribution board 2






- 2 tests carried out
- Test 1- fire broke out of box after ca 4 minutes
- Caused melting of mcbs
- Fire extinguished
- Damage unlike that of incident
- Initiating fire deemed too large

#### Fires inside distribution board 3





- Smaller initiating fire –
   4cm² diesel soaked pad
- Pad placed close to erosion damage on top of lower row of mcbs
- No spread of fire, died out after 2 minutes
- Damage very confined and unlike that seen in incident

Conclusion: Unlikely fire started in casing & spread out



 Test carried out with cupboard mock-up to examine character of fire involving likely fuels present and response of distribution board.

#### Construction:

- Plasterboard walls on softwood frame
- Two standard panels doors
- Shelves and toiletries cupboard installed

#### Contents:

- Shelves loaded with paper, cardboard, plastic items including trays & buckets
- Toiletries cupboard left empty no aerosols or FLs

#### • Electrical:

- Distribution board under load



- Ignition source 2 of No 7 cribs on top of box of plastic aprons
- Cupboard doors left open
- Test videoed and still record taken
- mcbs under load and connected through light bulbs during test





Time, minutes:seconds	Event
00:00	Cribs lit, flames licking up around distribution board
03:10	Plastic mcb covers begin to melt and run
05:30	Flames begin to die back and pool fire beginning to form
11:00	Polythene aprons begin catch fire
12:05	Dripping molten burning polythene transmits fire to floor at front of cupboard
14:45	Cardboard box under polythene aprons catches fire
17:15	Residual current device casing begins to melt
18:03	Residual current device casing falls to floor
18:10	Bulbs go out within 2s of each other
19:55	Fire extinguishers arrive to tackle fire







Damage similar to incident cupboard in terms of pattern and extent

Damage to mcbs and shelf contents similar

Some wooden components exhibited only minor crocodiling possibly due to a less severe test fire





## Conclusion: Damage pattern and extent similar

Fire more likely to have started in cupboard rather than distribution board

Likely to have broken out of cupboard at a similar time

Aerosols involved in incident fire



- Spark generation inside distribution board
  - Short circuit between casing & live supply cable at knock out hole
  - Earth to bus bar fault at lower bus bar
- Sparks produced on demand by a length of PVC sleeving attached to conductor routed out of casing. When pulled from the rear the necessary circuit was made.





- Sparks escaped from a nominally closed case
- Sparks escaped from both induced faults
- More sparks escaped from short circuit to case fault rather than earth to bus bar fault



#### Initial test series

Paper, plastics, cardboard

No ignitions obtained for both faults with 80 a cartridge fuse

#### Second test series

Cartridge fuse replaced with rewirable fuse wired with 1mm<sup>2</sup> copper

One ignition obtained with tissue paper









#### Test series 3

Earth to casing fault with live fed through 50 a Merlin-Gerin mcb

Fuels used included rigid PU foam, cotton cloth, 'Bluewipe', tissue paper, polyester wadding.

No ignition obtained from 118 tests




#### Fourth test series

Tests with materials impregnated with flammable liquid - acetone

83 tests with paper, foam, carpet, card

Height of target varied

One ignition obtained with foam







#### Fifth test series


Tests involving contents of aerosol cans – flammable liquids and liquefied gases eg butane

Aerosol can failure simulated by

- (a) injecting butane into a bag
- (b) Spraying hairspray into the bag

Ignitions easily obtained in both cases









**Acetone-soaked acrylic** 

### Conclusions 1



It is difficult to produce conditions leading to an electrical fault

It proved difficult to damage the insulation or initiate an arc

- Unlikely that the fire began within the distribution board
   If a fire occurred it is difficult to involve other fuels
- Damage more likely to have occurred as a result of a fire external to the unit

Testing and the damage support this

 It was difficult to ignite adjacent materials from faults in the unit excepting the contents of aerosol cans – gas or liquid

### Conclusions 2



The cupboard mock-up test was carried out

The fire initiated with two No 7 cribs grew to involve the cupboard contents over a period of about 20 minutes through the formation of a pool fire in plastic items.

At this stage the intermittent flaming extended to the full height of the cupboard and the electrical units were under severe attack.

The damage had some resemblance to that in the incident However, it appeared that, in the incident cupboard the wooden distribution board mounting board and internal cupboard doors had experienced more severe exposure.

It is likely that the initial fire at Rosepark was to some extent under ventilation control with high temperatures, copious smoke but limited flaming.

